Citigroup and the people who brought the financial meltdown

Citigroup to Pay Millions to Close Fraud Complaint
By EDWARD WYATT
New York Times
October 19, 2011

WASHINGTON — As the housing market began its collapse, Wall Street firms and sophisticated investors searched for ways to profit. Some of them found an easy method: Stuff a portfolio with risky mortgage-related investments, sell it to unsuspecting customers and bet against it.

Citigroup on Wednesday agreed to pay $285 million to settle a civil complaint by the Securities and Exchange Commission that it had defrauded investors who bought just such a deal. The transaction involved a $1 billion portfolio of mortgage-related investments, many of which were handpicked for the portfolio by Citigroup without telling investors of its role or that it had made bets that the investments would fall in value.

In the four years since the housing market began its steady descent, securities regulators have settled only two cases related to the financial crisis for a larger sum of money. This is also the third case brought by the S.E.C. accusing a major Wall Street institution of misleading customers about who was putting together a security and about their motive. Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase & Company both settled similar cases last year.

The settlement will refund investors with interest and include a $95 million fine — a relative pittance for a giant like Citigroup. On Monday, the company reported that in the third quarter alone it earned profits of $3.8 billion on revenue of $20.8 billion. The settlement may also have trouble getting approval from Jed S. Rakoff, the federal district judge in New York who must ultimately sign off on the fine and who has taken a hard line on S.E.C. settlements.

Neither the S.E.C. nor the Justice Department would say whether the case raised questions about whether Citigroup had been involved in any criminal wrongdoing. But the case highlights a growing frustration felt by foreclosed homeowners, investors and Wall Street protesters alike that few, if any, senior banking executives have faced criminal charges for losses growing out of the financial crisis.

Citigroup has settled one case stemming from the crisis. Last year, it agreed to pay $75 million to settle federal claims that it hid from investors vast holdings of subprime mortgage investments that were losing value during the crisis and that ultimately prompted the federal government to rescue the bank.

“The securities laws demand that investors receive more care and candor than Citigroup provided” to investors in the security, said Robert Khuzami, director of the S.E.C.’s enforcement division, referring to Wednesday’s action. “Investors were not informed that Citigroup had decided to bet against them and had helped to choose the assets that would determine who won or lost.”

The complex amalgamation of investments known as Class V Funding III produced $126 million in profits for Citigroup’s brokerage subsidiary, and another $34 million in fees for putting it together. All of that, including interest and the $95 million fine, will now be going back to the investors; the government will not receive anything.

In a statement, Citigroup noted that the S.E.C. did not charge it with “intentional or reckless misconduct.” Rather, it settled charges that its actions were negligent and misleading to investors. Despite its profits on the current deal, over all Citigroup lost tens of billions of dollars on its holdings of mortgage-related investments.

“We are pleased to put this matter behind us and are focused on contributing to the economic recovery, serving our clients and growing responsibly,” the company said in a statement. “Since the crisis, we have bolstered our financial strength, overhauled the risk management function, significantly reduced risk on the balance sheet and returned to the basics of banking.”

The S.E.C. on Wednesday also brought a case against Credit Suisse, which played a smaller role in the transaction, and against one individual at each company. But those individuals were midlevel employees in each company’s investment and trading departments; no senior executives at either company were charged...

Financial Crisis Panel Commissioners Leaked Confidential Information To Lobbyists, Report Alleges

Financial Crisis Panel Commissioners Leaked Confidential Information To Lobbyists, Report Alleges
7/13/11
Shahien Nasiripour
Huffpost

Republican commissioners on the panel created by Congress to probe the roots of the financial crisis leaked documents to partisan allies and shared confidential information with influence peddlers, according to a Wednesday report by Democrats on a Congressional oversight committee.

The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, led by Republican Rep. Darrell Issa of California, sought to investigate allegations that the bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was mismanaged by its Democratic majority, misused taxpayer funds, was compromised by conflicts of interest and colluded with Democrats in Congress as they sought to pass a financial reform bill.

Instead, the 400,000 emails and documents obtained by the investigative committee show that Republican commissioner Peter Wallison broke confidentiality rules by leaking documents to Ed Pinto, a colleague of his at the American Enterprise Institute, a prominent right-leaning Washington-based research and policy organization.

The misconduct did not stop there, according to the report. The assistant of Bill Thomas, the panel's vice chairman and another of the four Republican commissioners, shared information about the commission's hearings, targets and investigative direction with one of Thomas's colleagues at law firm Buchanan, Ingersoll, and Rooney, one of Washington's top lobbying shops. In one case, Thomas's colleague, Alex Brill, asked Thomas's assistant in a March 31, 2010, email about an upcoming hearing on Citigroup for his "friend who represents Citi." The bank was concerned it would be unfairly singled out at its hearing, wrote Brill, who is also the chief executive of economic and political consulting firm Matrix Global Advisors.

The partisan bent of the report, its findings and the investigation that led to it lends credence to the central criticisms that have long dogged the panel: A commission led by former politicians rather than prosecutors and economists would never get to the bottom of the financial crisis, and its findings would inevitably be viewed as a political report rather than as an objective look at the companies, policies and practices that caused the most punishing downturn since the Great Depression.

The House oversight committee was to hold a hearing Wednesday on the crisis commission. It was postponed to a future undetermined date, the crisis commission's former chairman, Phil Angelides, said in an email. Thomas and Brill did not immediately respond to requests seeking comment.

Wallison violated the commission's ethics rules by leaking confidential information to Pinto on "several" occasions, the report alleges.

In one case, the crisis commission's general counsel concluded that Wallison violated the ethics code by sharing a confidential staff memo with Pinto that used private housing data provided by the Federal Reserve under a confidentiality agreement between the commission and the Fed. Wallison and Pinto both pointed to government housing policies as the primary cause of the financial crisis, a position rejected by the broader committee.

Wallison acknowledged that he supplied Pinto with the confidential staff memo, but said he didn't know it was confidential at the time.

He also said that Pinto deserved to see the memo anyway, as the data its conclusions were based on directly challenged Pinto's data and his claim that the crisis was largely caused by government homeowners policies and subprime lending by mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

"I get this memo criticizing Pinto's data -- what was I supposed to do?" Wallison said. "Pinto should be the one to respond to criticism of his data."

Pinto said Wallison sent him the FCIC memo with a simple question: "What do you think?"

Both men maintain that Fannie and Freddie's subprime mortgage activities directly led to the crisis, despite an avalanche of data that has led government and university economists to conclude otherwise.

Perhaps more distressing to the House oversight committee's Democratic staff was the unauthorized disclosure of information about the crisis commission's investigations to Brill, a Washington influence peddler who once worked as a senior adviser to Thomas when he led the House Ways and Means Committee.

Thomas's assistant, who wasn't named in the Democratic report, shared with Brill internal draft reports; information about internal commission deliberations; plans to investigate foreign banks; and the commission planned treatment of certain companies under investigation, according to internal emails obtained by the House oversight committee.

The committee noted that it could not find any record of Brill working for the crisis commission in an official or advisory capacity. The committee also could not find any record of Brill signing a confidentiality agreement, a requirement of commission employment.

In one instance, Thomas's assistant emailed Brill a draft of a then-confidential staff report on Wells Fargo's 2008 acquisition of Wachovia, a teetering, giant bank that was being battered by turmoil in the financial markets. The assistant also shared information about the crisis commission's possible witness list for its hearing on the issue.

In a response, Brill made a number of suggestions he hoped the assistant would share with Thomas.

In another instance, Brill asked the assistant about the commission's plans to probe foreign banks.

Thomas's assistant not only said the commission was going to investigate these institutions in his reply, but he named them as well, identifying Deutsche Bank, UBS, BNP Paribas, RBS and Lazard Freres as institutions the commission was probing "for various purposes."

In March 2010, Brill asked the assistant about the crisis commission's plans for its upcoming hearing on Citigroup. Brill states on his firm's website that he's helped a "Wall Street investment bank" navigate policy matters in Washington.

"Fyi, just heard from my friend who represents Citi," Brill wrote in an email. "I guess Citi feels afraid that they will be painted as one of the worst offenders of subprime when really they think that they only dabbled in subprime. I don't know the truth in any of this but I guess the titles of the panels make this look like citi is the subprime devil while WMT [Thomas] was explaining to me that Citi is a great target to study because they did a bit of everything and that is more true for Citi than for anyone else. Any thoughts?"

Later that same day, Thomas's assistant replied to Brill, explaining how the commission would likely treat Citigroup officials during their hearing.

"They aren't going to be painted as a particularly bad offender of subprime origination, because they weren't a bad offender in that area," the assistant wrote. "However, they ended up taking $55B in losses associated with subprime and then got $45B in TARP and a government guarantee on $300B of assets. And their risk management re: their subprime exposure was, by any account, pretty awful. And, it is true that they are a good example because they did a little of everything, which means that we can discuss the entire subprime-universe during their hearing. So, while I don't think they will come across as the person who as ripping off the American public, I think they may come across as a pretty poorly managed company."

It's unclear whether Brill passed on this information to any clients or Citigroup representatives, the House oversight report notes.

In an Aug 2010 email to Angelides, the crisis panel's general counsel explained how such unauthorized disclosures could impede the commission's investigation, and open it up to legal liability.

"Disclosure of commission confidential information will gravely impair the commission's ability to conduct its business in the future by making it hard to secure the cooperation of other information providers in accessing their confidential information," he wrote. "And could expose the commission to damage claims for the improper release thereof."

Gillian Tett studied J. P. Morgan and predicted financial meltdown

Gillian Tett is an assistant editor of the Financial Times.

'Fool's Gold': The Banking World's Responsibility (listen to radio interview)
Fresh Air from WHYY
May 14, 2009

Journalist Gillian Tett warned about the problems in the financial industry long before many of her colleagues. In her new book, Fool's Gold, Tett examines the global economic meltdown and the role J.P. Morgan played in creating and marketing risky and complex financial products.

A reporter with Financial Times since 1993, Tett was named British Business Journalist of the Year in 2008, and Journalist of the Year in March by the British Press Awards.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104130944


Excerpt: 'Fool's Gold'

Fools Gold



Fool's Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe
By Gillian Tett
Hardcover, 304 pages
Free Press
List Price: $26.66




On half a mile of immaculate private beach, along Florida's fabled Gold Coast, sits the sugar-pink Boca Raton Hotel..

On one summer's weekend back in June 1994, a quite different clientele descended: several dozen young bankers from the offices of J.P. Morgan in New York, London, and Tokyo. They were there for an off-site meeting, called to discuss how the bank could grow its derivatives business in the next year... "It was in Boca where we started talking seriously about credit derivatives," recalls Peter Hancock, the British-born leader of the group...

They worked for the "swaps" department—a particular corner of the derivatives universe—which was one of the hottest, fastest-growing areas of finance. In the early 1980s, J.P. Morgan, along with several other venerable banks, had jumped into the newfangled derivatives field, and activity in the arcane business had exploded. By 1994, the total notional value of derivatives contracts on J.P. -Morgan's books was estimated to be $1.7 trillion, and derivatives activity was generating half of the -bank's trading revenue. In 1992-one year when J.P. Morgan broke out the number for public consumption-the total was $512 million.

More startling than those numbers was the fact that most members of the banking and wider investing world had absolutely no idea how derivatives were producing such phenomenal sums, let alone what so-called swaps groups actually did. Those who worked in the area tended to revel in its air of mystery.

By the time of the Boca meeting, most of the J.P. Morgan group were still under thirty years old; some had just left college...On Friday afternoon, they greeted each other with wild merriment and headed for the bars. Many had flown down from New York; a few had come from Tokyo; and a large contingent had flown over from London. Within minutes, drinking games got under way...Bill Winters, a jovial American who, at just thirty-one, was the second most senior official of them.

...The derivatives group was one of the most unruly but also most tightly knit teams. "We had real fun-there was a great spirit in the group back then," Winters would later recall with a wistful grin. When he and the rest of that little band looked back on those wild times, many said they were the happiest days of their lives.

[They had a good time ruining lives and melting down economies.]

One reason for that was the man running the team, Peter Hancock. At the age of thirty-five, he was only slightly older than many of the group, but he was their intellectual godfather. A large man, with thinning hair and clumsy, hairy hands, he exuded the genial air of a family doctor or university professor. Unlike many of those who came to dominate the complex finance world, Hancock sported no advanced degree in mathematics or science. Like most of the J.P. Morgan staff, he had joined the bank straight from getting his undergraduate degree... he especially loved developing elaborate theories about how to push money around the world in a more efficient manner...

The J.P. Morgan derivatives team was engaged in the banking equivalent of space travel. Computing power and high-order mathematics were taking finance far from its traditional bounds, and this small group of brilliant minds was charting the outer reaches of cyberfinance. Like scientists cracking the DNA code or splitting the atom, the J.P. Morgan swaps team believed their experiments in what bankers refer to as "innovation" — meaning the invention of bold new ways of generating returns — were solving the most foundational riddles of their discipline...

That stemmed in part from Hancock's intense focus on the science of people management. He was almost as fascinated by how to manage people for optimal performance as by financial flows.

The moment he was appointed head of the derivatives group, Hancock had started experimenting with his staff. One of his first missions was to overhaul how his sales team and the traders interacted. Against all tradition, he decided to give the sales force the authority to quote prices for complex deals, instead of relying on the traders...He then started inventing new systems of remuneration designed to discourage taking excessive risks or hugging brilliant projects too close to the vest. He wanted to encourage collaboration and longer-term thinking, rather than self-interested pursuit of short-term gains...

In later years, Hancock pushed his experimentation to unusual extremes. He hired a social anthropologist to study the corporate dynamics at the bank. He conducted firm-wide polls to ascertain which employees interacted most effectively with those from other departments, and he then used that data as a benchmark for assessing employee compensation, plotting it on complex, color-coded computer models. He was convinced that departments needed to interact closely with each other, so that they could swap ideas and monitor each other's risks. Silos, or fragmented departments, he believed, were lethal. At one stage he half-jokingly floated the idea of tracking employee emails, to measure the level of cross-departmental interaction in a scientific manner. The suggestion was blocked. "The human resources department thought I was barking mad!" he later recalled. "But if you want to create the conditions for innovation, people have to feel free to share ideas. You cannot have that if everyone is always fighting!"

One of Hancock's boldest experiments focused on the core group within the swaps team known as Investor Derivatives Marketing. The bankers attached to this team sat around a long desk under low ceilings on the third floor of the J.P. Morgan headquarters, and the group was somewhat anomalous in its responsibilities. Though some marketing of products to clients was done, the group acted more like an incubator for ideas that had no other obvious departmental home and handled a ragbag of products, including structured finance schemes linked to the insurance world and tax-minimizing products.

A few months before the meeting in Boca Raton, Hancock had approached Bill Demchak, an ambitious young banker with a good reputation around the bank, to run the IDM group. Determined to drive innovation, Hancock told him, "You will have to make at least half your revenues each year from a product which did not exist before!" By Wall Street standards, that was a truly peculiar mandate...

Demchak happily accepted the daunting mandate...

Demchak's razor-sharp mind dissected problems at lightning speed. A particular talent was lateral thought, pulling in ideas from other areas of banking...

Hancock installed another ambitious and driven banker in the London office of the team. Bill Winters, who had taken the breaking of his nose with such good cheer, also came from a relatively modest background by comparison to the Ivy League pedigrees of so many of the banking elite. He had studied at Colgate University in New York State, and joined the bank in the mid-1980s. He was blessed with good looks — female colleagues thought Winters looked a little like the actor George Clooney — but he preferred to stay out of the limelight...

Hancock first noticed Winters in the late 1980s, when he was working in the area of commodities derivatives.

"We sent him down to Mexico and somehow — I still don't know how — he persuaded the government to hedge half of its oil production and interest-rate exposure with us," Hancock recalled...Hancock appointed him to run the European side of the derivatives team with the expectation that the "two Bills," as their colleagues dubbed them, would work well together in tossing innovative ideas back and forth across the Atlantic.

Central to the swaps -team's quest now was to take the newfangled breed of financial products called derivatives into new terrain.

From FOOL'S GOLD by Gillian Tett. Copyright (c) 2009 by Gillian Tett. Reprinted by permission of Free Press, a Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc, NY.