Thursday, July 25, 2013

JPMorgan in Talks to Settle Energy Manipulation Case for $500 Million

JPMorgan in Talks to Settle Energy Manipulation Case for $500 Million
By BEN PROTESS and JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG
NYT
July 17, 2013

It is unclear whether FERC will pursue a separate action against Blythe Masters, a senior JPMorgan executive.

JPMorgan Chase, the Wall Street giant whose reputation in Washington has eroded in a matter of months, is now moving to avert a showdown over accusations that it manipulated energy prices.

The nation’s largest bank, which has previously clashed with its regulators, is seeking to settle with the federal agency that oversees the energy markets, according to people briefed on the matter. The regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, found that JPMorgan devised “manipulative schemes” that transformed “money-losing power plants into powerful profit centers,” a commission document said.

The potential deal, the people said, is expected to cost the bank about $500 million, a record for the commission, which has adopted a harder line with Wall Street over the last year. For JPMorgan, which reported a record $6.5 billion quarterly profit last week, the fine will hardly dent the bottom line.

The accusations against JPMorgan surfaced this spring in the confidential commission document, reviewed by The New York Times, that outlined a pattern of illegal trading in the California and Michigan electric markets. The document, a warning that investigators would recommend that the agency pursue civil charges, also claimed that a senior JPMorgan executive, Blythe Masters, gave “false and misleading statements” under oath.

It is unclear whether Ms. Masters would be included in the potential settlement, but people close to her said that the regulator was unlikely to file a separate action against her. Initially, investigators planned to recommend that the agency hold Ms. Masters and three of her employees “individually liable,” a move that would have cast a shadow over her long career on Wall Street, where she is known for developing complex financial instruments.

While the bank still disputes the accusations, the recent settlement talks signal a shift in strategy for JPMorgan, which previously declared its intention “to vigorously defend” itself. Other banks, including Barclays, are fighting the commission in similar cases, casting the agency as overly aggressive. A settlement with JPMorgan could undermine Wall Street’s counterattacks and pave the way for more settlements.

With the recent overture, JPMorgan appears to have taken a more conciliatory approach to Washington broadly, as it works to mend relationships with regulatory agencies. Its new tack, advocated by top JPMorgan lawyers, underscores the bank’s realization that it was swiftly losing credibility in Washington.

Within regulatory circles, JPMorgan had become known as something of a bully, a bank quick to strike a combative tone with regulators. In a Congressional report examining a $6 billion trading loss the bank sustained last year, investigators faulted it for briefly withholding documents from regulators. The energy markets regulator also accused the bank of stonewalling investigators.

A settlement with the commission would enable JPMorgan to resolve the embarrassing accusations without fighting a lengthy legal battle. It also would allow the bank to focus on its other legal woes as it remains caught in the cross hairs of at least eight other federal offices. In addition to inquiries stemming from the trading loss, banking regulators are weighing enforcement actions against the bank for the way it collected credit card debt.

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s chief executive who was once known as Washington’s favorite banker, acknowledged in his annual letter to shareholders that “unfortunately, we expect we will have more” enforcement actions in “the coming months.” He apologized for letting “our regulators down” and vowed to “do all the work necessary to complete the needed improvements.”

To reinforce the conciliatory approach, the bank has more readily dispatched executives to Washington. It also committed resources to bolster internal controls, a measure that could appease regulators.

The people briefed on the matter, who spoke on the condition that they not be named, cautioned that JPMorgan and the energy regulator were still negotiating a potential fine. The terms are subject to change. Any action recommended by investigators — settlement or otherwise — requires approval by a majority of the five-member energy commission.

The prospect of a deal with JPMorgan Chase was reported earlier by The Wall Street Journal.

A spokeswoman for the bank declined to comment. The commission also declined to comment.

JPMorgan’s run-in with the energy regulator escalated in March, when investigators sent the document outlining the findings of their inquiry. In response, the bank issued a lengthy response to the accusations in mid-May, the people briefed on the matter said, ultimately spurring settlement talks in recent weeks.

For the energy regulator, a settlement would be the latest in a string of actions against big banks. On Tuesday, the commission ordered Barclays to pay a $470 million penalty for suspected manipulation of energy markets in California and other Western states by some of its traders. The bank is fighting the charges.

Like Barclays, JPMorgan faces accusations stemming from its rights to sell electricity from power plants. The rights come from assets the bank accumulated in the 2008 takeover of Bear Stearns.

But soon after the acquisition, the plants became a losing business that relied on “inefficient” and outdated technology. Under “pressure to generate large profits,” investigators said in the March document, traders in Houston devised a solution. Adopting eight different “schemes” between September 2010 and June 2011, the traders offered the energy at prices “calculated to falsely appear attractive” to state energy authorities. The effort prompted authorities in California and Michigan to pay about $83 million in “excessive” payments to JPMorgan, the investigators said.

In a 2012 filing in federal court, the energy regulator took aim at JPMorgan for attempting to thwart the investigation. The bank, the regulator said, refused to comply with a subpoena seeking e-mails that JPMorgan claimed were confidential because they contained private conversations between the bank and its lawyers.

In the March document, the investigators elaborated on the bank’s pushback. The 70-page document said that the bank “planned and executed a systematic cover-up” of documents that exposed the trading strategy, including profit and loss statements.

The investigators also traced some of the obfuscating to Ms. Masters. After California authorities began to object to the bank’s trading strategy, Ms. Masters “personally participated in JPMorgan’s efforts to block” the state authorities “from understanding the reasons behind JPMorgan’s bidding schemes,” the regulator, known as FERC, said.

The investigators also cited an April 2011 e-mail in which Ms. Masters ordered a “rewrite” of an internal document that questioned whether the bank had skirted the law. The new wording: “JPMorgan does not believe that it violated FERC’s policies.”

SAC: Steve Cohen’s (Allegedly) Corrupt “Information Gathering Machine”

Steve Cohen’s (Allegedly) Corrupt “Information Gathering Machine”
By Charles Gasparino
Time
July 25, 2013

When I first met Steve Cohen back in 1999, we were discussing SAC’s vaunted trading strategies, the ones that made his hedge fund one of the most successful in the finance world and burnished Cohen’s rep as one of the world’s best traders.

I said that based on my reporting — I was working for the Wall Street Journal at the time — Cohen started SAC in 1992 with a technique that wasn’t that much different than a day trader: He was trading huge blocks of stock by looking for “teenies,” or small price increments, that he could magnify into massive returns because of the sheer size of his trades.

It was the only time Cohen seemed angered during our discussion, as I recall. “No,” he shot back emphatically, “we employ real trading strategies around here. We do research.” Cohen went on to explain how his firm, SAC, had transformed itself into something much more than a day-trading sweat shop — it was now, he claimed, essentially the biggest and best information gathering machine in the world.

That information machine has now been deemed by the U.S. Department of Justice to be a criminal enterprise. Today’s indictment, filed in Manhattan federal court, of the once mighty hedge fund accuses SAC a multi-year “scheme” to profit from the use of illegal tips—also known as inside information.

It’s interesting to note that, according to prosecutors, the alleged scheme began in 1999—around the time Cohen was boasting of the firm’s new information edge. It’s also interesting to note that while Cohen himself wasn’t charged in the indictment, references to him in the documents are everywhere, which means all those headlines of Cohen himself being “out of the woods” are probably wrong.

In other words, don’t be surprised if you see an indictment of Cohen in the coming weeks as well.

If you don’t believe me, read the indictment. “The SAC Owner had sole trading discretion over his portfolio and made these decisions principally based on trading recommendations from SAC [portfolio managers],” it says. “In particular, at all relevant times the SAC Owner required each [portfolio manager] to share ‘high conviction’ investment ideas–i.e., the investment recommendations in which the SAC [portfolio managers] had the greatest confidence–with the SAC Owner. In fact, providing such ideas to the SAC Owner was an express part of a SAC PM’s duties and was emphasized to SAC [portfolio managers] in the hiring process and once working at SAC.”

As my book about the Fed’s relentless pursuit of Cohen, Circle of Friends, explains, the Feds believe having a “high conviction” investment idea is code for trading on material, non-public information, a.k.a. insider trading. They also believe almost no major trade gets done inside SAC without Cohen’s blessing — and based on my sources inside the government, they believe it’s just a matter of time before they connect the dots to Cohen himself.

I should point out that Cohen maintains his innocence and that the information machine he created runs for the most part on information and research of the legal variety. His people tell me the few bad apples at SAC that have used inside information — as many as 9 former or current company executives have been implicated during the insider trading crackdown — are anomalies.

The Feds, of course, feel they have proof that SAC, under Cohen’s watch, is a dirty shop.

One thing is certain: The mounting pressure from the government probe that’s been investigating the firm since at least 2007 is taking its toll on Cohen, both professionally and personally. Money from outside investors has been fleeing the fund for months as the government’s scrutiny has intensified.

With the indictment, SAC is basically being put out of business, though Cohen could still conceivably manage his own personal fortune of around $9 billion. But the Feds are looking for a chunk of that as well. The indictment says the scheme occurred over an 11-year period and that SAC has to give back its illegal profits.

Since most of the money now in SAC in Cohen’s, that means his net worth could take the hit and that hit could amount to billions.

A friend of mine of who knows Cohen personally said he ran into him at the MLB All-Star game at Citi Field, the home of the New York Mets, in which Cohen owns a small stake. Cohen “looked terrible…and he’d gained 15 pounds” since the time the two met just a month or so earlier. More than that, my source told me, Cohen conceded that his business was basically finished and “at this point my No. 1 goal is not getting personally indicted.”

If that’s the case, he should have stuck with trading teenies.

Read more: http://business.time.com/2013/07/25/steve-cohens-allegedly-corrupt-information-gathering-machine/#ixzz2a7Q44Aqd